功能主義 (心靈哲學)

功能主义，也称机能主义是心灵哲学中的观点之一，认为心灵状态（信念、欲望、痛苦等）都仅仅基于它们的功能角色。功能角色是，一个心灵状态与其他心灵状态（其他人的心灵）之间的关系，感官输入和行为输出。[1] 功能主义是同一理论和行为主义的发展演变。

多重实现

多重实现是功能主义的重要部分。根据标准的功能主义理论，心灵状态回应功能角色。它们像阀门一样，一个阀门可以由塑料或铁等等构成，只要它们能当作阀门来用。类似地，功能主义者认为，心灵状态也可以被解释，而不需要什么实现它们的物理的中介（例如大脑），人们只需要考虑更高层面的功能即可。

但是，也有功能主义理论与同一理论相组合，否定了多重现实。例如Functional Specification Theories (FSTs) (Levin, § 3.4)。最著名的支持这个观点的人是大卫·刘易斯[2]和戴维·阿姆斯特朗.[3] 根据FSTs，心灵状态是功能角色的特殊“实现者”，而不是功能角色本身。

类型

机械状态的功能主义
图灵机。

机械功能主义


批判

批判这一理论的反例，可见于中文屋、中文脑和倒错光谱、孪生地球。

参见

参考资料
  1. Block, Ned. (1996). "What is functionalism?" a revised version of the entry on functionalism in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, Macmillan. (PDF online 页面存档备份，存于)
  2. Lewis, David. (1980). "Mad Pain and Martian Pain". In Block (1980a) Vol. 1, pp. 216–222.
  3. Armstrong, D.M. (1968). A Materialistic Theory of the Mind. London: RKP.

推荐阅读
  • Armstrong, D.M. (1968). A Materialistic Theory of the Mind. London: RKP.
  • Baron-Cohen S.; Leslie A.; Frith U. . Cognition. 1985, 21: 37–46. PMID 2934210. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8.
  • Block, Ned. (1980a). "Introduction: What Is Functionalism?" in Readings in Philosophy of Psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  • Block, Ned. (1980b). "Troubles With Functionalism", in Block (1980a).
  • Block, Ned. (1994). Qualia. In S. Guttenplan (ed), A Companion to Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell
  • Block, Ned. (PDF). a revised version of the entry on functionalism in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, Macmillan. 1996 [2020-02-24]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2017-12-30）.
  • Block, Ned and Fodor, J. (1972). "What Psychological States Are Not". Philosophical Review 81.
  • Chalmers, David. (1996). The Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Crabb, B.G. (2005). "Fading and Dancing Qualia - Moving and Shaking Arguments", Deunant Books.
  • DeLancey, C. (2002). "Passionate Engines - What Emotions Reveal about the Mind and Artificial Intelligence." Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Dennett, D. (1990) Quining Qualia. In W. Lycan, (ed), Mind and Cognition. Oxford: Blackwells
  • Levin, Janet. (2004). "Functionalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2004 Edition), E. Zalta (ed.). (online页面存档备份，存于)
  • Lewis, David. (1966). "An Argument for the Identity Theory". Journal of Philosophy 63.
  • Lewis, David. (1980). "Mad Pain and Martian Pain". In Block (1980a) Vol. 1, pp. 216–222.
  • Lycan, W. (1987) Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Mandik, Pete. (1998). Fine-grained Supervience, Cognitive Neuroscience, and the Future of Functionalism.
  • Marr, D. (1982). Vision: A Computational Approach. San Francisco: Freeman & Co.
  • Polgar, T. D. . The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008 [2020-02-24]. （原始内容存档于2019-05-19）.
  • Putnam, Hilary. (1960). "Minds and Machines". Reprinted in Putnam (1975a).
  • Putnam, Hilary. (1967). "Psychological Predicates". In Art, Mind, and Religion, W.H. Capitan and D.D. Merrill (eds.), pp. 37–48. (Later published as "The Nature of Mental States" in Putnam (1975a).
  • Putnam, Hilary. (1975a). Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge: CUP.
  • Searle, John. . Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 1980, 3 (3): 417–424. doi:10.1017/s0140525x00005756.
  • Smart, J.J.C. (1959). "Sensations and Brain Processes". Philosophical Review LXVIII.

外部链接
維基教科書中的相關電子：Consciousness studies
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